



Top Secret

NSA review completed



Communist Violations of the Vietnam and Laos Settlement Agreements and Related Developments

25X1



DIA review(s)
completed.

25X1

Top Secret

30 January 1974

Copy No. 46

Page Denied

30 January 1974

Forty-Eighth Report

COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*

(This report covers the week from
23 January through 29 January 1974)

The Key Points

- Both infiltration and logistic activity slowed last week as the North Vietnamese celebrated the Tet holidays.
- Another antiaircraft artillery regiment deployed into South Vietnam's central highlands last week.
- The North Vietnamese have completed a road across central Laos to within 6 miles of the Mekong River and will begin construction of another major road on 30 January which will link up with NVA Route 14 near the DMZ.
- Recent satellite photography over North Vietnam showed a new military base and new construction of rail and petroleum pipeline/storage facilities.

* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

25X1

Preface

This report is the forty-eighth in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

DETAILS

**I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies******Personnel Infiltration***

1. The pace of troop infiltration slowed last week, as only two new regular combat groups were detected at Binh Tram 8 near Vinh, North Vietnam. Although these groups, which are traveling to the B-3 Front, were reported with an aggregate strength of 215 troops, they probably have actual strengths of at least 500 troops each. Consequently, they have been added to our infiltration estimate at the latter strength, as has a third "gap-filled" group which, although undetected, has been committed to infiltrate the B-3 Front. The flow of specialists also decreased last week -- only four small groups composed of an estimated 75 specialists were observed in southern Laos. All of these personnel are traveling to the COSVN area. The low number of troops and specialists observed moving southward probably reflects the celebration of the Tet holidays by the North Vietnamese.

2. An intercept from northern North Vietnam has indicated that about 2,500 new troops will be sent south in the near future. On 22 January, a probable training regiment in Thanh Hoa Province announced that some 1,500 personnel were being prepared to infiltrate to South Vietnam, while about 1,000 are to be sent to "central" Laos. All of these personnel apparently were sent on leave for Tet about a week earlier, probably the final step prior to the beginning of their southward journey. The personnel traveling to Laos, however, will be the first troops sent to that country since last November. None of these personnel are included in our estimate of infiltration starts, shown below, since there is no evidence that they have as yet started south.

Redeployments***Continued Augmentation of NVA Air Defenses
in South Vietnam***

3. Recent COMINT indicates that at least one and possibly two North Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiments have moved from southern Laos into the western highlands of GVN MR 2. An intercept of

* See the Special Annex for a discussion of the capabilities to detect the deployment of North Vietnam's strategic reserve forces.

**Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September - 29 January**

	1972-73	1973-74
Total	71,000	47,500
MR Tri-Thien-Hue	18,500	2,000
MR 5	9,000	2,000
B-3 Front	13,500	7,000
COSVN	20,000	14,000
Southern Laos/MR 559	10,000	22,500

a North Vietnamese air activity report of early January indicated that the 232nd AAA Regiment probably is now operating in South Vietnam in the tri-border area, increasing Communist strength in MR 2 by some 1,000 men. The unit had been scheduled to move into South Vietnam in late December but was not expected to relocate this far south. In addition, the NVA 593rd AAA Regiment in Kontum Province reported the 21 January transfer of some of its weapons to the NVA 234th AAA Regiment - last located in southern Laos. This turnover of weapons suggests that the 234th also may be relocating to the highlands of South Vietnam. If true, this would be the third AAA regiment - the other was the 218th - to move from southern Laos into South Vietnam within the past month.

4. Hanoi clearly intends to provide maximum protection to Communist-controlled territory and major logistic corridors in western South Vietnam. For example, because of the lack of combat activity in southern Laos, the North Vietnamese apparently are relocating some of their air defense forces there to areas in South Vietnam which are more vulnerable to South Vietnamese air operations. Overall, the North Vietnamese have expanded their air defense force structure in South Vietnam to the largest ever noted. Currently, there are at least 25 air defense regiments (24 AAA and one SAM) in-country - 20 in MR 1, three in western MR 2, and two in northern MR 3.

5. The map depicting Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam has been revised to include major Communist AAA and artillery commands in order to reflect a more complete listing of VC/NVA combat units. These additions, however, do not change the total number of Communist regular combat troops as they have previously been carried in the CIA/DIA order of battle.

Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

		MR 1	
		VC/NVA	RVNAF
VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	88,000	103,000
186,000	372,000	325th	VNMC
		324B	Airborne
		304th	1st
		711th	2nd
		2nd ³	3rd
		673rd AAA	Regional Forces

1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.


2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to the division.

		MR 2	
		VC/NVA	RVNAF
		36,000	78,000
		320th	23rd
		10th	22nd
		3rd	Regional Forces

		MR 3	
		VC/NVA	RVNAF
		38,000	94,000
		9th	25th
		7th	18th
		5th	5th
		77th AAA	Regional Forces
		429th Sap Cmd	
		69th Arty Cmd	

		MR 4	
		VC/NVA	RVNAF
		24,000	97,000
		1st ³	21st
			9th
			7th
			Regional Forces



515520 2-73 CIA

25X1
25X1

Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies

North Vietnam

6. In contrast to the heavy volume of traffic detected moving over the past few months, supply shipments in the North Vietnamese Panhandle were light last week. Most of the slowdown in activity this week probably resulted from the celebration of the Tet holidays, as many rear service units were given time off during the week. Despite the holidays, however, some supply shipments did continue. Logistic units in the Vinh area reported receiving some 20 tons of clothing on 25 January and more than 60 tons of ammunition on the following day - including 18 tons of 130-mm artillery ammunition. On 26 and 27 January, two shipments of 61 tons of supplies, including 12 tons of 130-mm ammunition, were dispatched to northern Laos. Farther south in the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ, even less logistic activity was noted. Except for the shipment of 200 tons of unidentified cargo on 27 January, no other significant activity was detected in the area.

Laos

7. Following the pattern observed in North Vietnam, logistic activity in the Laotian Panhandle declined appreciably, probably reflecting celebration of the Tet holidays. Aerial reconnaissance from Muong Nong to the tri-border area [] showed mostly small convoys of 25 trucks or less headed south. COMINT also confirmed the slowdown in truck traffic, as only a few convoys - the largest of which was 160 trucks on 26 January - were detected transiting the system.

25X1

8. The downturn in activity this week is probably only temporary. Plans for a spring "transportation offensive" shortly after Tet by logistic units in the Panhandle were revealed in a 24 January intercept. Such drives have occurred in previous years and normally are intended to move large quantities of supplies through Laos and into South Vietnam and Cambodia.

South Vietnam

9. In northern South Vietnam, there was no significant logistic activity detected during the reporting period.

II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South Vietnam and Laos

South Vietnam

10. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January 1973, since 15 June 1973, and for the past week (23-29 January 1974) are shown below:

Military Region	Total Since 27 January Cease-Fire		Total Since 15 June Cease-Fire		Last Week (23-29 Jan 74)	
	Major	Minor	Major	Minor	Major	Minor
Total	4,597	30,795	2,228	16,840	33(87) ¹	402(613) ¹
MR 1	1,566	5,764	541	2,405	5	22
MR 2	789	5,072	525	3,218	3	58
MR 3	708	5,262	306	2,686	4	34
MR 4	1,534	14,697	856	8,531	21	288

1. Figures in parentheses denote totals of the previous week.

11. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively. Operational reports since 19 December, however, have attempted to distinguish between violations initiated by Communist and friendly forces. Only those violations designated as Communist-initiated are reported in the above tabulation.

Laos

12. There was no significant military activity in Laos during the past week.

III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

Results of Satellite Photography over North Vietnam

25X1

[REDACTED] The coverage permitted comprehensive analysis of most major military and logistic targets.

25X1

Military Equipment Imports

14. There were no indications in the photography of recent overland or seaborne imports of armored vehicles. SAMs, artillery, or associated military equipment. A search of the major military training and equipment storage areas, including those at Vinh Yen, Xuan Mai, and the Cong Phu Armor Parking Area in the Panhandle, showed no significant changes in activity or inventories, suggesting the absence of any recent large in-country transfers of heavy weapons. Eight canvas-covered armored vehicles, however, were on a parked train, facing south in a rail yard on the southern edge of Hanoi. The armored vehicles possibly were en route to the new armor parking area south of Thanh Hoa City.

New Military Base

15. A new military complex was located in the central Panhandle 20 miles northwest of Vinh. This facility, constructed since [REDACTED] covers an area 1-1/4 by 2 miles and contains 137 buildings arranged in five separate groups. A total of 35 field artillery pieces in groups of 12, 12, and 11 pieces were associated with three groups of structures, a strong indication this complex probably houses an artillery regiment.

25X1

25X1

Transport Activity

16. No unusual logistic activity was noted. Preliminary scan of the major rail and highway routes and maritime facilities showed moderate traffic and stockpile levels, but little difference from those recorded during the last quarter of 1973. No coverage of the cross-border routes leading into Laos and South Vietnam was available on this mission.

17. About 5,000 vehicles - mostly cargo trucks - were in the major vehicle parks located between Dong Dang and Hanoi, about the same number observed during the last six months. The inventories in these parks, however, have not been static. Comparative coverage of the P'ing-hsiang

25X1

25X1

Railyards [] indicated some 200 to 300 vehicles were offloaded and driven south across the border, probably into major vehicle parks in northern North Vietnam.

New Petroleum Developments

18. The Chinese are building a large petroleum storage area, adjacent to the rail line, about six miles north of the P'ing-hsiang border crossing. At least six large vertical storage tanks are under construction and should hold about 30,000 tons of petroleum when completed. The current storage capacity at P'ing-hsiang is about 9,000 tons. In a similar development, a new petroleum bunkering quay was detected near Hon Gay. This quay could also give the North Vietnamese a second point for offloading small quantities of petroleum into the nearby pipeline and storage area. The other receiving facility is a floating terminal at nearby Bai Chay constructed late last year. Both of these terminals and the one at Haiphong, however, are limited to shallow draft vessels.

19. The mission also provided evidence of new improvements to North Vietnam's internal petroleum distribution system. A new large-diameter (eight inch) petroleum pipeline segment is under construction south of Hanoi. The 64 miles of pipeline will fill the last gap in the eight-inch pipeline system built since the Vietnam cease-fire. The new line parallels the earlier-built four-inch pipeline from Hanoi to the large dispersed storage area at Cu Dai, northwest of Vinh. DOD analysis cannot confirm the pipeline as being either eight or four inches in diameter.

New Rail Construction

20. After the bombing halt in January 1973, the North Vietnamese quickly restored through service on major rail lines. The lone exception was the Kep - Hon Gay meter-gauge rail line. No attempt was made to repair this line until last August. Since then, a five-mile segment of new railbed has been nearly completed from the railyards north of Kep southeast to where it meets the existing rail line. From here to Hon Gay, about 60 to 70 miles, new construction consists of curve straightening, grade improvement, and the building of new bridges and culverts. Although previously meter-gauge, the construction techniques observed thus far suggest that the line will probably be compatible with the Kep-PRC border standard-gauge line.

21. At the present rate of construction, this major project could be completed by the end of 1974. Completion of the new segment would provide direct access between China and Hon Gay, the latter being a major

25X1

coal-producing area. It is possible that there may be some link between the opening of this rail line and the building of the new petroleum storage area at P'ing-hsiang. Because Hon Gay Port cannot now handle large-scale coal and petroleum shipping operations because of its shallow depths, the new rail line may be used to ship coal overland to China, with China reciprocating with exports of oil and other commodities.

22. The same photography also indicated the Panhandle rail line is being improved. Four bridges are under construction on the line, two north and two south of Vinh. The bridges being built north of Vinh will replace existing bypasses, while completion of two south of Vinh indicates an intent to extend through rail service another 55 miles south to within 40 miles of Dong Hoi Port.

*The North Vietnamese Have Completed
Route 8/81 Across Central Laos*


23. The North Vietnamese have opened Route 8/81 from the North Vietnamese border (Nape Pass) across central Laos to the vicinity of the Mekong River (see the map on transportation). Reportedly, NVA army engineers and conscripted labor began restoring and clearing the western 50-mile segment of 8/81 last fall. Since then, work progressed rapidly, and [redacted] the road was complete and open to truck traffic. Photography [redacted] confirmed reports that the final gaps had been cleared and graded, and a motorable route now led to a junction with Route 13, some six miles from the Mekong. Other reports indicate that the North Vietnamese have also cleared a road west of Route 13 to the Thai border, which, by January, was supporting truck traffic. The road leading from Route 13 to the Mekong, however, has not yet been confirmed in photography.

25X1
25X1

24. The Route 8/81 corridor has long been used as an infiltration route by Communist insurgents moving to and from North Vietnam and Laos to Thailand. The completion of a motorable road along this route will enhance Hanoi's logistic capability and bolster NVA and Pathet Lao security and control in central Laos. The route also could be used to move supplies from North Vietnam to insurgents operating in northeast Thailand.

*New Road Construction in Southern North Vietnam
Slated to Begin Soon*

25. Work on a new road that will extend about 95 miles from the Mu Gia Pass along the eastern slope of the Annamite Mountains in Quang Binh Province to a juncture with NVA Route 14 near the DMZ was ordered





to be begun on 30 January. This order was contained in a 21 January directive from Headquarters, Military Region 559 which directed the 14th Engineer Regiment to transfer all its personnel, immediately after Tet, to an undisclosed area to begin construction on the new road. By avoiding low-lying areas susceptible to flooding, the road will ease logistic movements through the North Vietnamese Panhandle and by-pass portions of the recently upgraded Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos. According to earlier reporting (see the 3 January report), the road is slated for completion within a year.

NVA 1st Division

26. Recent analysis of COMINT [redacted] indicates that the understrength North Vietnamese 1st Infantry Division in northern GVN MR 4 is no longer operating as a division-size force. The Division's 44th and 46th Regiments apparently have been deactivated and their personnel, along with the Division's support units, assigned to the 101D Regiment, the only remaining regiment of the Division. The deactivation apparently was the result of losses incurred during heavy fighting along the South Vietnam/Cambodia border in the fall of 1973 and reduces Communist combat strength in GVN MR 4 by some 1,000 troops. The 1st Division headquarters and its reinforced 101D Regiment have both recently relocated from Cambodia into South Vietnam's Kien Giang Province, where they currently are operating.

25X1



25X1

ANNEX

INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH

In the year since the cease-fire accord for South Vietnam was signed, almost 109,000 North Vietnamese troops and specialists have infiltrated southward. Of this total, some 84,000 have started south since 27 January 1973, and the other 25,000 were moving through the pipeline on that date. Since the reaffirmation of the original agreement on 15 June 1973, about 58,000 troops and specialists have been sent south. The following table shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, by month and destination, since 1 January 1973.

Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since 1 January 1973¹


	COSVN	B-3 Front	MR 5	MR Tri- Thien-Hue	Southern Laos/ MR 559	Total
Total	27,000	12,500	9,000	14,000	26,500	89,000
1973						
Jan	7,000	5,000	4,000	2,500	18,500
Feb	5,000	500	1,500	1,000	8,000
Mar	1,000	1,000
Apr	1,000	1,000
May	7,000	7,000
Jun	1,500	1,500
Jul	3,000	3,000
Aug	1,500	1,500
Sep	2,000	2,000	3,000	7 000
Oct	14,000	14,000
Nov	1,000	1,000	5,500	7,500
Dec	3,500	1,000	4,500
1974						
Jan 1-29	9,500	5,000	14,500

1. Excludes special purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.



CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF


(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1973)





CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF

(1 AUGUST 1973 TO THE PRESENT)



25X1

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

Top Secret



Top Secret